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Abstract:  
Concern has been raised if the construction sector can cope with the demands currently 
being placed on it by the government and private sectors. This will paper identify three 
alternative definitions of the capacity limits of the UK construction sector. The 
economic limit on capacity is the point where the long-term cost curve rises as 
diseconomies of scale start to impact on production. The planning limit is the point at 
which the price escalation starts to become politically unacceptable. The technological 
limit is the maximum output that the industry can produce. 
 
An analysis UK of the UK construction output over the past thirty years will identify the 
periods when the output of the construction sector was over the planning limit and when 
it was below the economic limit. These are undesirable as it will involve escalating 
tender prices in the former case and unemployment in the latter case. The more desirable 
periods when output was between the economic limit and the planning limit will also be 
identified. 
 
Surveys of capacity utilization by members of the Construction Confederation will be 
used to calibrate the model. Based on the analysis it is expected that the economic limit 
for the UK construction sectors is around 80% of the technological capacity while the 
planning limit is probably in the region of 85% of technological capacity. 
 
The paper will conclude that the industry was operating at or near to the planning 
capacity prior to the current recession.  It was consequently on the margin of 
sustainability. This could lead to future problems when the industry recovers. 
 
Keywords:  
Capacity, sustainability, tender price escalation, resource inputs. 
 
1:  Introduction 
1.1:  The capacity problem 
 
Prior to the recent economic downturn there was concern that the Government's 
programme of public service renewal would place great strains on the construction 
sector with massive expenditure planned on housing (£3B), schools (£5B), hospitals 
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(£4B), and defence (£5B). That is before account is taken of the railway infrastructure 
renewals and the impact of the 2012 London Olympics (Brown, 2004).  
 
The Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) also expressed some concern about the 
ability of the construction sector to meet this challenge due to skill shortage particularly 
in the area of management and professional staffing. The Construction Confederation 
appear confident that the industry can cope with the likely demand, however the CIOB 
have argued that there should be a systematic review of the capacity of the industry to 
deal with the expected demand. They further argue that strategies be developed to ensure 
that the industry can expand to deliver the required workload (Brown, 2004). Similar 
problems have been experienced in recruiting civil and structural engineers (Kitching, 
2006). 
 
The objective of this paper is to identify the sustainable capacity of the UK construction 
by reference to economic data — notably construction output, changes in construction 
costs and tender prices — over the past thirty years. The study will focus on the main 
peaks and troughs in UK construction output such as the unsustainable boom of the early 
1970s and late 1980s and the subsequent recessions. 
 
1.2:  Background 
 
The construction sector is critical to the early stages of economic growth. The 
construction of industrial and commercial buildings along with concomitant 
developments in roads and other infrastructure are a precondition to economic 
expansion. Capacity limits on the construction sector can be expected to act as a 
constraining factor on overall economic growth. There are a number of examples from 
recent history of attempts at economic recovery foundering due to the failure of the 
construction sector to deliver.  
 
For example, in the 1930s USA, there was the New Deal, instigated by President 
Franklin Roosevelt. This was an attempt to drive the US economy out of the great 
depression by ‘pump priming’ by major construction works especially hydroelectric 
projects. Examples include the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Grand Coulee Dam. 
The aim was to generate jobs and economic activity during the publicly funded 
construction phase with the expectation that the private sector would take advantage of 
the infrastructure developments and the electrification.  
 
The policy was partially successful; however it did not achieve its main objective. Some 
have attributed the failure of the new deal to end the great depression on the decision to 
fund the programme by taxation rather than borrowing as Keynes subsequently argued. 
It has also been suggested that ‘bottlenecks’ in the construction sector and skill shortages 
were also to blame. 
 
Similarly, in the early 1970s, there was an attempt to expand the UK economy out of 
economic difficulties, the dash for growth. This expansionist approach was based, to a 
large extent, on the promotion of major projects and the use of housing improvement 
grants. The major projects promoted during this period included the Humber Bridge and 
Concorde.  
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There were also the subsequently unsuccessful attempts the build a massive integrated 
airport and seaport on the Essex coast at Maplin, and the Channel Tunnel and also to 
cover much of central London with concentric motorway rings. The final phase of the 
new town programme was under way by this stage. This involved creating new cities 
based on existing towns such as Milton Keynes and Northampton.  
 
The dash for growth failed partially due to lack of capacity in the construction sector. 
Rising tender prices — see the ‘Wood Report’ also known as the Public Client and the 
Construction Sector (NEDO, 1975) — followed and in turn caused demand to be choked 
off. The strategy was already in the process of collapsed by the time of the Arab-Israeli 
war and the subsequent hike in oil prices. OPEC’s action on oil prices contributed to a 
shift away of public and financial opinion that caused the scrapping of the Channel 
Tunnel, the London motorway ‘box’, and Maplin (Hall, 1982). Subsequently the 
ambitious new town programme was scaled down considerably. 
1.3:  Definitions of capacity 
Following Hillebrandt (1975), it is possible to identify three approaches to the definition 
of capacity: 
 
i) The technological definition: the maximum sustainable output assuming all 
productive units are operating to their full extent. This approach ignores economic 
factors and consequentially has limited applications except under extreme conditions 
such as war. 
 
ii) The economic definition: the point at which long run average costs start to rise and 
diseconomies of scale arise. This approach takes account only of economic factors. It 
is based on assumptions of perfect competition that are not appropriate for the 
construction sector. 
 
iii) The planning definition: the maximum output attainable within the limits or 
conditions considered ‘acceptable’ at the time. What is ‘acceptable’ in this context is 
determined by subjectively by the government of the day in the context of economic 
policy and political priorities. 
 
The third definition remains somewhat of a compromise between the first two 
approaches. The limiting factor is the degree of price escalation acceptable. This will be 
determined by the counter-inflationary policy of the government and also by the price 
elasticity of demand for the products of the industry. While this type of approach is not 
as fashionable today as it was in the halcyon days of economic planning in the 1960s, it 
remains an important issue for all governments. Figure Number 1 below illustrates the 
distinction between the three approaches. 
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Hillebrandt (1975) argued that capacity couldn’t be considered without reference to the 
time scales in question. Time would permit personnel to be recruited and trained, 
material production to be built-up, plant acquired and capital to be raised. Effectively 
capacity is a dynamic not a static concept. Capacity can expand to meet sustained higher 
demand just as it can contract to cope with continued falling demand. Thus it might be 
better to consider capacity in the context of the rate of growth of output. The capacity 
limit will correspond to the sustainability of the growth rate.  
 
Similarly account needs to be taken of policy issues pertaining to training, health and 
safety, innovation, etc. These can have an impact on the ability of an industry to react to 
changing demand within a short time period. It is also necessary to take account of the 
mix of output.  
 
Thus a higher output may be possible for a scenario based on new towns and large scale 
civil engineering projects, characterized by that of the UK in the early 1970s, than one 
based on housing improvement and inner city refurbishment more typical of the late 
1970s. Thus the precise mix of work can have an impact on the output that is likely to be 
delivered by the industry even with the same level of resource availability. This is tied 
up with the productivity that is obtainable. 
2: Approaches to the study of capacity 
2.1: Time series approach 
Taylor et al (1970) suggested this approach in a study of nineteen sectors of the UK 
















Ceiling of ‘acceptable’ prices 
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a time series as Figure Number 1 below. A trend line joining the ‘peaks’ in the time 
series diagram can be assumed as the capacity. Under capacity working can be estimated 
by the gap between the time series and the trend line. While Hillebrandt (1975) saw this 
approach as being acceptable for a general comparative study of a variety of industrial 
sectors, it is likely to as be uninformative for an in-depth study of an individual industry.  
 
The approach is also flawed in that it rests on the assumption that what was achieved in 
the past can be repeated. Thus the peak output achieved by the industry may no longer 
be viable. It may not be possible to replicate past achievements if operatives and staff 
have retired, or quarries have been exhausted, and materials plants closed. It is also 
highly dependent on price indices to convert output at current prices to constant prices. 
Errors in the price indices could distort the time series and give rise to misleading 
outcomes. Also new facilities can be brought into use and new staff trained to enable the 
industry to surpass previous peaks. 
 
It is essential that the time series be based on constant price data. Errors in preparation of 
the index numbers necessary to produce a constant price series could distort the trends 
identified. 
Time series graphs are useful in that they illustrate year-on-year changes in output 
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2.2: Resources as determinants of output 
John Parry Lewis (1967) outlined an approach to the problem by linking output to 
resource inputs in a report for the National Economic Development Office. See also 
Panic (1978) for a study of capacity utilization in UK manufacturing. This approach 
rests on the assumption that the ratio between the key resource inputs and outputs is 
relatively stable.  
 
The Building Research Establishment carried out a number of investigations into 
resource usage in the 1970s. Given the coefficients of inputs necessary to produce a 
given level of output, the capacity can be modelled by a series of linear equations. It is 
necessary to identify the available quantity of the resources in question. This would 
include home production and, where relevant, imports. 
 
Thus if the original question was questioning the maximum feasible output of the 
construction sector, this would lead to a number of further questions as to what the 
maximum feasible output of the brick industry, cement industry, the steel industry, etc., 
as well as availability of the primary inputs: labour and capital. This approach suggests 
that the constraining factor on construction output will be determined by the availability 
and cost of the various inputs needed for the construction process. 
2.3: Input-output approach 
This has parallels to those points addressed within the input-output framework 
developed by Wassily Leontief. While this approach was not developed specifically to 
deal with problems of resource limitation, it can be adapted for this purpose. Input-
output analysis deals with inter-industrial relationships — for example, the inputs 
required from the various materials supply industries to produce construction projects — 
that have similarities to the resource issue outlined above. It, again, rests on the 
assumptions of fairly stable technical coefficients. These are the quantity of inputs 
required to produce a unit of output. 
 
Figure Number 3 below illustrates the inputs and inputs affecting construction using this 
approach. The inputs to the construction process can be divided into primary inputs — 
labour, land, and capital — and intermediate inputs such as materials, components, 
transport and professional services. The approach concentrates on the relationships 
between outputs and intermediate and primary inputs. 
 
This approach facilitates the quantification of the inputs and outputs. Coefficients 
representing the value of each input needed to produce a set amount of output. For 
example in the UK in 1995, the inputs to construction from the structural clay industry 
amounted to just under £407M. With the gross output of construction at £87,602, this 
amounts to a direct input of £4.65 per £1,000 of construction output. 
 
The approach also allows for indirect input to be computed. This would involve the use 
of structural clay products by industries that supply construction. Direct and indirect 
inputs of structural clay products to construction amounted to £6.65 per £1,000 of gross 
output in 1995. 
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The above technique allows us to identify the production of key inputs (direct and 
indirect) including labour to enable the construction industry to produce a target output. 
 
With knowledge of the supply-side input output coefficients and with information on the 
availability of key resources likely to be in short supply, it should be possible to check 
possible output scenarios for construction to see if they are achievable without 
unintended consequences such as escalating tender prices. 
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2.4:  The industry as a bottleneck 
 
An alternative explanation is that it is the industry and the individual firms, as organic 
entities, that create the bottlenecks and escalating prices rather than the resources that 
they employ. If this case it is the poor organization within the industry rather than 
pressure on resource inputs that causes the difficulties. 
 
3:     Constraining Factors 
3.1:   Raw materials and manufactured components 
 
Raw materials could act as a constraining factor on construction output. It used to be 
thought that in the short-run, running-down stocks of materials could increase capacity.  
This was limited by the amount held for each material and component — less than one 
month’s supply for cement and plasterboard, and one to for months supply for bricks, 
tiles and pipes — thus this will be useful only in the very short term. With current 
thinking moving away from holding stocks of materials, this will no longer apply.  
 
Some increase in output of the materials may be possible due to increased utilization of 
plant in the materials supply industries.  Improvement in output is also possible by 
introducing additional shifts and/or weekend working. Each material will, however, have 
to be considered separately with particular attention to those materials that are 
anticipated to be critical. Such expansion could reduce unit costs by spreading fixed 
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charges over the higher output or could increase costs because of non-productive 
overtime and premium payments.  
 
Increases in capacity for materials supply have been achieved by installing modern plant 
while keeping the obsolete plant on standby to satisfy the fluctuations in demand.  
 
In periods of high demand at home, is likely that imports will be drawn in and exports 
reduced.  Construction has a lower marginal propensity to import than most other 
industries because of the low price/weight ratio of most building materials.  Thus this 
particular issue will yield little extra for raw materials, although manufactured 
components may be significant. The diversion of materials and/or components destined 
for export to the home market might prove more important. 
 
3.2:  Site Operatives 
 
Shortages of labour could certainly impair the growth of the construction sector. The 
increase in output would depend on the ability of the industry to recruit labour. This 
might come from the ranks of the unemployed or from other sectors using the same skill 
base. Given time it could come through additional training or from improved 
productivity. It is more likely; however, that additional labour will be imported from 
overseas. In the past, Ireland has proved a major source of labour for construction.  
 
Now it is more likely to be from Eastern Europe.  Allowance for retirements and those 
moving out to and in from other sectors plus the impact of any productivity gains. Table 
number 1 below summarizes these issues 
 
If labour were assumed to be a factor likely to constrain construction output the impact 
would depend on the various categories of labour likely to be in short supply. Key skills 
such as joinery and plumbing would have the most impact. 
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Table Number 1: Constraining Factors for the Construction Sector 
After Hillebrandt (1975) 
Time scale Constraining factors  
 Operatives Materials 
Immediate short run  Unemployed workers 
 Overtime, shifts 
 Increase hours worked 
 
 Run down stocks 
 Extra utilization of 
existing plant capacity 
Future capacity with no 
major policy decisions 
 Increase productivity 
 Attract labour from: 
a) Other sectors and industries 
b) Other countries 
 Additional training from: 
a) Government training schemes 
b) Apprenticeship 
c) Other training 
 Reduce wastage of manpower 
 Improve labour productivity 
 
 Increase productivity in 
materials sector 
 Change in balance of 
imports over exports 
Future capacity with major 
policy decisions 
 Mechanization and automation 
 Pre-fabrication and system 
building 
 Change in policy on: 




 Change in fixed plant & 
buildings 
 Changes in the production 
process 
 Changes in trade policy 
 
 
The above table summarizes the main points from a previous paper looking at manpower 
issues relating to construction capacity (Hillebrandt, 1975). The factors are classified as 
to their timescale – immediate short-run – and if governmental policy changes are 
involved or not.  
 
3.3:   Managerial and administrative staff 
 
Shortages of professional, technical, administrative and above all managerial staff is 
considered by many to be the real constraining factor on capacity for the industry. This 
may not apply for the individual firms since mobility of managerial staff suggests that 
they can always be recruited, but will certainly affect the industry as a whole. The 
approach to this question is similar to that for operatives.   
 
Very little additional output is likely to be obtained from the recruitment of extra staff in 
isolation. However, is certainly imposes limits to growth if other factors are introduced 
and efficient production is to be maintained. Companies will not operate efficiently if 
they lack managerial staff with the key skills needed to finish contracts on time and on 
budget. 
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3.4:   Capital 
 
Fixed capital should not present a problem. Plant and equipment used in construction is 
unlikely to be in short supply and the level of imports of machines could be stepped up 
to deal with any problems likely to be encountered in the future. Even if it became a 
problem, it is doubtful if this would seriously inhibit construction output given the 
ability of firms to substitute labour for capital. 
 
Working capital could present more of a problem if firms were being inhibited by lack 
of bank loans etc. This has been a problem for small to medium construction companies 
with poor credit ratings particularly during periods up to the 1970s when a credit 
squeeze was in operation. However, while this may impact on individual firms it is 
extremely unlikely to produce a significant effect on the overall output. Larger firms 
with better credit ratings would absorb such work. 
 
3.5:  Land 
 
The availability of land has proved to be a constraining factor for private housing 
development, particularly in the Southeast of England. The application of green belt 
policy has resulted in a shortage of land that has been partially addressed through the 
increased use of Brownfield land. Land can be seen as restraining the expansion of 
speculative housing. 
 
3.6:  Services 
 
There are significant inputs from services sectors such as transportation, professional 
services (including architecture and surveying consultancy), financial services, and 
hiring and lasing of plant. It is unlikely that any of these sectors could significantly 
inhibit construction output. 
 
3.7:  Company and industry organization 
 
There remains a possibility that the industry organization and companies themselves 
might introduce constraints into the output. The once dominant traditional mode of 
procurement separates design from construction and operates with a culture of 
confrontation and conflict.  
 
Similarly it could be that the operation of the firms themselves might not make the best 
of available resources to a lack of entrepreneurship. The incidence of insolvency in 
construction is the highest amongst UK industries. The industry has also been attacked 
for neglecting training and helping to create one of the bottlenecks listed above. 
 
It these points are accepted it could be argued that capacity is not entirely determined by 
the resource inputs as suggested by Parry Lewis (1967). Thus the industry itself could be 
seen as introducing additional constraints in the process of turning inputs into outputs. 
 
Ball et al (2000) argue that the construction firm is the embodiment of the site 
managerial and professional skills covered earlier. Thus shortages of management and 
professional staff could be seen as an industry issue rather than a resource input issue. 
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4:  Analysis 
4.1: Introduction 
 
The approach selected for this paper is to counterpoise changes in resource input costs 
with tender prices changes. If tender price escalation is running ahead of resource input 
cost increases, this will be indicative that the industry is approaching ts effective 
capacity. If the reverse is the case it is probably that the industry s operating below 
capacity. 
 
The theoretical justification for this is presented below. 
 
4.2: Time series analysis 
 
As expected, basic time series analysis does not yield much information. Figure Number 
2 above illustrates the value added for the UK construction sector from 1948 to 2004 in 
constant (2002) prices. It shows the output of the sector growing in a cyclical manner. 
The data is included in Table Number 4 below. 
 
The weakness of the time series approach is illustrated by the situation in the early to 
mid-1970s. Over the period 1971 to 1973 construction appeared to suffer severe capacity 
problems as evidenced by the escalation in tender prices. Figure Number 4 gives the 
annual change in value added for construction in constant (2002) prices. This is 
computed using equation (1). 
 
 ΔV t =  (V t – V t-1)/V t-1  ×  100%   (1) 
 
 Where  V t = Construction value added for year t 
  V t-1 = Construction value added for time year t-1 
  ΔV t = Change in construction value added from year t-1 to year t 
 
Figure Number 4 also included the annual change in tender prices for the year in 
question as presented in Table Number 3 below. 
 
While this approach suffers from a number of severe limitations, it does present a basic 
idea that is expanded on below by comparing the time series for construction output with 
the changing prices for resource inputs (Inputs in Figure Three) and construction tender 
prices (Outputs in Figure Three) 
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Figure Number 4: Annual Change in Value Added for the UK Construction Sector (1950-2005) 
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4.3: Theoretical issues 
 
As two of the three definitions of capacity are related to price change, the analysis will 
be based on changes in price and cost indices. Construction may be seen as having a 
dispersed industrial structure with few barriers to entry (Myers, 2004), Ball et al (2000) 
identified three issues affecting the ability of construction companies to generate higher 
than normal profits: 
 
1. Low short-run supply elasticity in construction markets. This obviously relates to 
the ability of the industry to increase its capacity in line with higher demand. The 
suggestion is that mark-ups for construction companies will vary over the 
economic cycle. Companies will be in a position to raise their prices during 
upturns in demand when capacity limits were being stretched. However they 
would also face the situation of having to cut margins during downturns in 
demand. 
 
2. Ease of entry and exit in construction submarkets. This is concerned with 
economic or structural restrictions placed on the ability of firms to move from 
one sector of construction to another. For example, the rundown of the council 
house building programme and motorway construction in the mid-1970s forced 
firms to switch into new expanding areas such as speculative house building and 
offshore engineering. The more restrictions on freedom of entry to submarkets 
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the more likely firms established in the growing sectors will be able to sustain 
high mark-ups. One example of restrictions to entry might be a reluctance of 
clients to let work a new entrant to a particular submarket on ground of risk 
reduction even at the expense of cost implications. 
 
3. The ability of construction firms to earn economic rent. This relates to the 
exploitation of market position or monopoly power. Ball et al (2000) argued that 
there was generally little scope for UK contractors to earn economic rent given 
the structure of the industry and the limited use of plant and equipment, most of 
which tended to be hired. In addition technical innovation that can yield 
economic rent for manufacturing firms is unlikely to apply to contractors. Ball et 
al (2000) did concede that innovation in organizational structure might give some 
firms sufficient leverage in the short-run to take economic rent. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the above factors are more likely to apply as output 
approaches the capacity limit of the industry, or the submarket in question. Rising 
demand will cause the problems associated with low short-run elasticity of supply to 
kick in. It may also give contractors, at least in less competitive submarkets, the 
opportunity to exploit economic rent. 
 
Thus it is proposed to use price and cost indices as proxy variables to help identify the 
level of capacity working in the industry at a given point in time. 
 
 
4.4: Changing Prices and Costs 
 
The analysis in this paper will be based on the change in construction resource cost 
indices (RCI) and tender price indices (TPI). RCI measure the change in prices for the 
key inputs used by the construction sector such as materials, components, and labour.  
TPI, on the other hand, measure the change in output prices changed by the industry. 
The assumption is that if the industry is getting overheated it is likely that TPIs will rise 
faster than RCIs as firms seek to capitalize on their strong market position. During a 
slump in construction demand it is assumed that the rise in TPI will be less than the RCI 
as firms are forced to absorb some of the cost increases to win contracts.  
 
Hence the industry is assumed to be below economic capacity if the RCI runs ahead of 
the TPI. It is assumed to be above economic capacity when the TPI exceeds the RCI. So 
the definition of economic capacity is a situation where changes in RCI are matched by 
changes in TPI.  
 
The data is taken from the Quarterly series published by the Building Cost Information 
(RICS, 2006) where possible. The RCI is taken from the BCIS General Building Cost 
Index while the TPI is taken from the BCIS All in Tender Price Index. However as this 
Quarterly series only extends back to the early 1980s, earlier data was taken from 
Housing and Construction Statistics (HMSO, 1984). The RCI figures were taken from 
the Building Cost Indices. The TPI figures were taken from the Department of the 
Environment (DoE) data produced by the Directorate of Quantity Surveying Services 
(DQSS). This is not a true tender price index as it is restricted to contracts let by the 
DoE, but it is probably representative of tender prices and is the best available data. 
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The two series were seasonally adjusted using a four-quarter moving average to smooth 
out short-term fluctuations. The computations use equations (2) and (3) below: 
 
ΔRCI t =  (RCI t – RCI t-1)/RCI t-1  ×  100%   (2) 
 
 Where RCI t = Resource cost index for quarter t 
  RCI t-1 = Resource cost index for quarter t-1 
  Δ RCI t = Change in resource cost index from quarter t-1 to quarter t 
 
ΔTPI t =  (TPI t – TPI t-1)/ TPI t-1  ×  100%   (3) 
 
 Where TPI t = Tender price index for quarter t 
  TPI t-1 = Tender price index for quarter t-1 
  Δ TPI t = Change in tender price index from quarter t-1 to quarter t 
 
The analysis is based on the assumption that if problems are cause by short supply of 
input resources — labour, materials, etc — this will be shown by resources costs 
spiralling upwards ahead of background inflation. If the problems lie with the 
organization and managerial structure of the construction sector it will be indicated by 
tender prices rising faster than resource costs and background inflation. 
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Figure Number 5: Quarterly Change in Cost and Prices Indices for the UK Construction Sector (1971-1984) 
Source: Housing and Construction Statistics (HMSO, 1970-1985) 
 



























The period 1971 to 1973, illustrated in Figure Number 5, above corresponds with the 
Dash for Growth instigated by the Conservative Government under Premier Ted Heath 
and Chancellor Tony Barber. It was the last attempt to expand the economy out of 
economic difficulties using an old fashioned Keynesian-style boom. Tender prices over 
this period escalated dramatically. While there was high background inflation, it should 
be noted that tender price increases were around double the increases in resource costs 
(Hillebrandt, 1984).  
 
This Dash for Growth had already failed as illustrated by the collapse in tender prices 
some months before the Arab-Israeli war brought about a 400% increase in the price of 
oil and plunged the world into a major recession. It appears clear that the high levels of 
demand as evidenced by the booming tender prices was not reflected in a big increase in 
construction output. While the output of the industry did go up in monetary terms after 
allowance for inflation, the annual increase in construction value added was less than 2% 
per annum over the three years in question. It would appear that either increasing tender 
prices choked off the extra demand or supply-side constraints curbed output. Maybe a 
combination of the two is the most likely explanation?  
 
The industry recovered from 1974 and by 1977, tender prices moved ahead of resource 
costs. The first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran heralded a period of uncertainty and a 
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further oil price ‘spike’ helped push the economy into recession once more with tender 
prices again collapsing. 
 
 
Figure Number 6: Quarterly Change in Cost and Prices Indices for the UK Construction Sector (1984-2005) 
Source: Building Cost Information Services (RICS, 1980-2006) 
 




































Over the period 1984 to 1987 it would appear that the industry was in balance at or near 
to economic capacity. Towards the end of the 1980s another unsustainable boom hit the 
industry. This did not affect the whole of the UK, as was the case with the Dash for 
Growth. It mainly impacted on London and the South East of England plus the M4 
corridor. Its epicenter was undoubtedly around Canary Wharf in the London Docklands. 
 
In this case the industry did deliver on increased output. There was a 10% increase in 
output in 1987, 8% in 1988 and a further 5% in 1989. This was achieved by the 
attracting large numbers to of construction professionals and operatives to move to the 
South East from as far afield as Scotland and France 
 
Then the Government became concerned about rising inflation and started to push up 
interest rates. When this failed to curb rising house and consumer prices subsequent 
rounds of interest rate increases were applied. Eventually these interest rate increases 
worked their way through the economy and the industry was plunged into recession. For 
some firms having two, three, or four contracts let or in progress from the height of the 
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boom cushioned this. This turned out to be a ‘double dip’ recession as just as recovery 
seemed to be in sight, a second Europe-wide recession kicked in. 
 
The industry experienced falling output for the next three years before some measure of 
equilibrium was restored from 1994 onwards. Since then the industry has experienced an 
unprecedented 11 years of growth. Over this period the TPI have tended to exceed the 
RCI but by a modest 1% per quarter. 
 
4.5: Calibration of model  
 
To calibrate the model into actual capacity, estimates of capacity utilization from the 
construction trade associations are employed. The Construction Confederation, 
successor to the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, conducted surveys of 
capacity utilization amongst its members. These were presented in the form of the 
percentage of firms between 90% and 100% of capacity, those between 50% and 90% of 
capacity and those below 50% of capacity.  
 
The results are included in Table Number 5 below. The overall capacity utilization is 
estimated assuming average capacities of 95% for the first group, 70% or the second 
category and 45% for the third group. The Federation of Master Builders carried out a 
similar survey. The results are illustrated in Figure 7 below: 
 
 
Figure No 7: Estimated capacity utilization in the UK Construction Sector (1988-2003) 
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The results of the two surveys are similar with the FMB figures slightly lower. Also, as 
expected, the FMB members were hit earlier by the 1989 recession than the larger 
contractors represented by the Construction Confederation. The smaller builders would 
be hit quicker by a slump due to relying on projects of shorter duration. The economic 
capacity would appear to correspond to around 80% and the planning capacity at circa 
85% of technological capacity. 
 
4.6: Capacity in context 
 
The figure of 80% may seem rather low for economic capacity in comparison with 
figures quoted for other sectors of the economy. This may stem from the nature of 
construction mainly as a series of limited term projects. This has parallels with the idea 
of frictional unemployment in labour markets. This identifies the mobility reserve 
needed facilitate employees changing jobs. Construction is particularly prone to 
frictional unemployment because many operatives are employed by the contract rather 
than by the company. 
 
Frictional unemployment effectively applies to the firm as well as to labour markets. 
Spare capacity is needed to cope with change over from one project to another. This is 
complicated by the fact that projects run down slowly towards their completion and new 
project take some time to build-up in their early stages. This suggests that construction 
will run more effectively when operating at around 80% capacity. Process industries, by 
comparison, can operate at much higher capacities than construction.  
 
Cowling (1982) estimated capital utilization in UK manufacturing to be between 90 and 
100% throughout the 1950s into the early 1970s. This did drop as UK manufacturing 
was badly hit by competition from imports and by the economic recession in the mid-
1970s. 
Table Number 2: Capacity Utilization in UK manufacturing  




utilization  Year 
Capacity 
utilization 
1955 98.1  1967 93.1 
1956 94.6  1968 94.9 
1957 93.7  1969 94.9 
1958 90.6  1970 92.9 
1959 93.2  1971 89.6 
1960 98.0  1972 89.7 
1961 95.1  1973 91.6 
1962 92.0  1974 85.2 
1963 93.1  1975 80.9 
1964 98.4  1976 84.4 
1965 98.4  1977 84.3 
1966 96.6  1978 83.6 
 
It would appear to be the case that following sustainable increases in construction, the 
industry will continue to expand so as to keep output within the range of 80-85% of 
revised capacity. 
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5:   Conclusions 
5.1:  Summary of analysis 
 
Over the period it seems that construction resource costs followed movements in retail 
prices quite closely while tender prices were much more volatile. They surged up and 
down with the boom bust cycle and have only been stable for a sustained period in 
recent years. That would suggest that the high prices in times of boom were caused by 
the industry itself rather than the resource inputs of labour, materials, etc. 
 
Table Number 3 below attempts to summarize the above analysis in terms of the level of 
capacity working for the UK construction sector:  
 
Table Number 3: Construction capacity 1971-2005 
 
Time Period Capacity category Capacity estimate Notes 
1971-1973 Over planning capacity — Dash for Growth 
1974-1977 Under economic capacity — Recession following oil price explosion 
1978-1979 Over economic capacity — Recovery 
1980-1983 Under economic capacity — Recession following oil price hike 
1984-1986 Economic capacity — Recovery  
1987-1989 Over planning capacity 85% + Dockland Boom 
1990-1994 Under economic capacity 65%–70% Double dip recession 
1995-1998 Economic capacity 75%–80% Recovery 
1999-2006 Over economic capacity 80%–85% Sustained growth 
2007- Under economic capacity 65%–70%? Slump 
 
The objective would appear to be to keep the output of the industry at or around the 
economic capacity but below the planning capacity. That corresponds to between 80% 
and 85% of physical capacity using the Construction Confederation figures. This seems 
to have been achieved from the mid 1990s through to around 2007 but only in 4 years 
out of the previous 22 years. The remainder mostly involved lurching between boom and 
slump. 
 
Over recent years the industry has been hovering near to the limit of sustainability at 
around 85% capacity. However it has not so far produced the adverse effects of the early 
1970s or for that matter the late 1980s.  
 
5.2:  Explanations for sustained output growth 
 
The question remains as to why the industry has delivered increased output over ten 
years or more when it failed so conspicuously thirty years ago. 
 
One explanation could involve the removal of constraints on public sector demand. In 
the early 1970s, cost yardsticks were in place. These made it difficult if not impossible 
to build hospitals, schools, and social housing without extensive ‘creative accountancy’. 
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By the late 1970s, cost yardsticks had been scrapped and replaced by cash limits on 
public sector capital spending. This allowed the Treasury to impose controls on all 
public sector new building. The advent of Public Finance Initiative and Public Private 
Partnerships removed the ‘dead hand of the Treasury’ and permitted a major expansion 
in public sector construction.  
 
However, this does not explain how the supply-side constraints so apparent in the 1970s 
have been overcome. Indeed they would presumably have loomed even larger without 
the demand constraints on public sector work.  
 
The industry has gone through fundamental restructuring over the past thirty years. The 
shift of the private sector towards design and build and the public sector towards 
contractor-led procurement systems may be one explanation. The growth of supply chain 
management and partnering may provide another explanation for the remarkable 
performance. This should really be no surprise as the move the reorganize construction 
covered by the Latham and Egan Reports was prompted by the perceived poor 
performance of the industry. 
 
While the industry was coping, concern remains about what will happen in the build-up 
to the 2012 London Olympics especially combined with the £10B London Crossrail 
project (Majekodunmi, 2006). It was suggested that there was potential for  a repeat of 
the situation in the late 1980s when the Dockland developments sucked in construction 
professionals from Scotland and the English regions. This was also likely to pose 
problems for Scotland especially if Glasgow’s bid to host the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games is successful. 
 
There have been suggestions from the Office of Government Commerce, that panels be 
established to anticipate construction bottlenecks (OGC, 1973). This echoes the idea of 
Public Procurement Agency to smooth out the flow of public sector contracts that was 
initially proposed in the 1970s in the controversial Labour Party Document “Building 
Britain’s Future” (Labour Party 1977). The new Public Sector Construction Clients’ 
Forum (PSCCF) is intended to focus on leading the drive for further improvements in 
whole-life value for money in the procurement of built environment in the public sector. 
 
It is fair to say that the industry just about coped through the long boom but is very near 
to the margin of sustainability and care needs to be taken to avoid a repetition of the 
scenario from the late 1980s or even a repeat of the damaging consequences of the early 
1970s boom and bust cycle. 
5.3:  The current recession and beyond 
 
The credit crunch and the subsequent recession allay any fears about the consequences 
of the industry being unable to deliver. However the recession has not necessarily solved 
the problem but merely postponed it. 
 
May construction firms and professional consultants have responded by cutting staff. 
Some of the redundant staff and operatives could end up being lost to the industry 
permanently. 
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The question remains as to what will happen when the economy does start to recover. 
There could be a flood of work unleashed on the construction sector that it will be 
unable to satisfy and all the problems of an under capacity including price inflation as 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The industry have to cope with replacing the ‘baby boom’ generation who have been a 
major component in the workforce as they retire over the next five years or so. They will 
also have to replace those ‘shaken out’ in the current recession. 
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Table Number 4: Construction Value Added for the UK (1948-2004) 
Source: UK National Accounts (HMSO, 2006) BCIS (RICS, 2006 
 
 






Output Tender Prices Resource Costs Retail Prices
1953 43.5 £23,831 6.67% 5.7% — 5.8%
1954 45.5 £24,926 4.40% 3.6% — 5.5%
1955 45.6 £24,981 0.22% 3.4% — 3.4%
1956 48.1 £26,351 5.20% 3.3% — 3.3%
1957 48.0 £26,296 -0.21% 3.2% — 3.2%
1958 47.9 £26,241 -0.21% 3.1% — 1.6%
1959 50.5 £27,665 5.15% 3.0% — 1.5%
1960 53.1 £29,090 4.90% 4.4% — 1.5%
1961 57.2 £31,336 7.17% 5.6% — 1.5%
1962 57.8 £31,665 1.04% 6.7% — 2.9%
1963 57.6 £31,555 -0.35% 6.3% — 4.3%
1964 63.5 £34,787 9.29% 5.9% — 2.7%
1965 66.5 £36,431 4.51% 4.4% — 4.0%
1966 67.7 £37,088 1.77% 4.3% — 3.8%
1967 70.4 £38,567 3.84% 4.1% — 3.7%
1968 72.2 £39,553 2.49% 4.9% — 4.8%
1969 71.7 £39,279 -0.70% 5.6% — 5.7%
1970 70.3 £38,512 -1.99% 8.8% — 6.5%
1971 71.6 £39,225 1.82% 14.6% — 8.1%
1972 72.9 £39,937 1.78% 14.2% — 10.3%
1973 74.6 £40,868 2.28% 12.4% — 13.6%
1974 66.9 £36,650 -11.51% 11.6% 18.3% 15.7%
1975 63.4 £34,732 -5.52% 11.4% 19.0% 16.8%
1976 62.5 £34,239 -1.44% 10.2% 16.6% 15.5%
1977 62.2 £34,075 -0.48% 14.9% 15.7% 14.8%
1978 66.5 £36,431 6.47% 16.8% 15.4% 14.6%
1979 66.9 £36,650 0.60% 11.7% 14.1% 13.5%
1980 63.3 £34,678 -5.69% 9.4% 12.7% 11.9%
1981 58.3 £31,938 -8.58% 6.6% 11.5% 10.6%
1982 63.0 £34,513 7.46% 3.7% 9.8% 8.8%
1983 67.0 £36,705 5.97% 1.8% 7.5% 6.9%
1984 70.2 £38,458 4.56% 3.7% 6.1% 5.6%
1985 70.4 £38,567 0.28% 4.6% 5.3% 4.6%
1986 73.3 £40,156 3.96% 7.0% 5.2% 4.8%
1987 81.8 £44,812 10.39% 7.5% 5.5% 5.4%
1988 89.0 £48,757 8.09% 5.1% 6.0% 6.2%
1989 93.7 £51,332 5.02% 1.8% 6.2% 6.5%
1990 96.4 £52,811 2.80% -0.3% 5.8% 6.3%
1991 88.7 £48,593 -8.68% -2.5% 5.3% 5.3%
1992 85.1 £46,620 -4.23% -2.4% 4.5% 4.5%
1993 84.1 £46,073 -1.19% 0.2% 4.1% 3.3%
1994 87.3 £47,826 3.67% 2.7% 3.7% 2.7%
1995 87.3 £47,826 0.00% 5.0% 3.5% 2.6%
1996 89.7 £49,140 2.68% 5.9% 3.5% 3.0%
1997 92.1 £50,455 2.61% 4.5% 3.3% 2.8%
1998 93.1 £51,003 1.07% 4.5% 3.2% 2.8%
1999 93.4 £51,167 0.32% 6.1% 3.1% 2.6%
2000 94.6 £51,825 1.27% 6.4% 3.6% 2.3%
2001 96.3 £52,756 1.77% 6.2% 3.9% 2.1%
2002 100.0 £54,783 3.70% 7.1% 4.4% 2.4%
2003 105.2 £57,632 4.94% 6.7% 4.8% 2.3%
2004 108.9 £59,659 3.40% — — —
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Table Number 5: Construction Confederation and Federation of Master Builders Estimates of Capacity (1989-2003) 
Estimate by Construction Confederation (CC) 





Q1 61 38 2 85% 76% 
Q2 53 45 4 83% 72% 
Q3 45 51 6 80% 70% 
1989 
Q4 36 58 7 78% 67% 
Q1 28 64 9 76% 65% 
Q2 23 66 11 74% 63% 
Q3 19 69 14 72% 62% 
1990 
Q4 14 71 16 70% 61% 
Q1 9 73 18 69% 61% 
Q2 9 73 19 68% 61% 
Q3 8 73 19 67% 62% 
1991 
Q4 8 73 20 67% 62% 
Q1 7 73 20 67% 63% 
Q2 7 75 19 67% 64% 
Q3 6 77 17 67% 65% 
1992 
Q4 6 78 16 68% 65% 
Q1 5 80 14 68% 65% 
Q2 5 84 20 69% 66% 
Q3 7 77 14 69% 67% 
1993 
Q4 7 82 11 70% 68% 
Q1 17 69 14 72% 69% 
Q2 35 58 7 73% 71% 
Q3 28 64 6 74% 71% 
1994 
Q4 25 55 20 74% 72% 
Q1 14 84 2 74% 72% 
Q2 23 76 1 75% 72% 
Q3 27 73 0 76% 73% 
1995 
Q4 25 73 2 76% 74% 
Q1 21 78 1 77% 74% 
Q2 29 70 1 78% 75% 
Q3 45 54 1 78% 75% 
1996 
Q4 35 65 0 79% 77% 
Q1 34 65 1 79% 78% 
Q2 41 53 2 80% 79% 
Q3 47 53 0 81% 80% 
1997 
Q4 64 35 2 82% 80% 
Q1 43 56 1 84% 81% 
Q2 64 35 1 84% 80% 
Q3 57 43 0 83% — 
1998 
Q4 49 46 5 83% —
Q1 59 40 1 83% —
Q2 51 48 1 83% —
Q3 54 46 0 84% —
1999 
Q4 58 41 1 85% —
Q1 67 33 0 85% —
Q2 59 41 0 85% —
Q3 53 45 2 84% —
2000 
Q4 60 37 3 84% —
Q1 61 38 1 84% —
Q2 63 37 0 84% —
Q3 47 50 3 84% —
2001 
Q4 57 43 0 84% —
Q1 57 42 1 84% —
Q2 56 44 0 84% —
Q3 52 47 1 84% —
2002 
Q4 59 41 0 84% —
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